Self-Fulfilling Grievances:

Flemish War Casualties and the Front Movement during the First World War*

Thomas Gepts & Robert Braun

Department of Sociology

UC Berkeley

February 16, 2022

*We would like to thank Laura Acosta Gonzalez for helping with the data collection process.

Abstract

We study how ethnic movements in hierarchical settings can transform perceived but non-existing social problems into real social problems through the activation of ethnic fault lines. We zero-in on grievances in the context of the Front movement, an organization of Flemish soldiers in the trenches of WW1 which protested the increased risk of dying because of ethnic discrimination by their Walloon officers. A combination of difference-in-difference analysis and Piecewise exponential models reveals that Flemish soldiers were more likely to perish after (and not before) the Front movement started mobilizing and that this change was more pronounced in units that experienced Front movement mobilization. Additional tests suggest that these patterns emerged because of negative responses to protests by Walloon peers and superiors. Taken together our findings demonstrate the importance of self-fulfilling grievances, an understudied process through which movements socially construct reality with potentially unintended consequences.

Keywords: *Ethnic Conflict, War, Social Movements, Self-Fulfilling Prophecies*

Word Count: *11,549 words (Including Abstract, Endnotes, and References)*

1 Introduction

Recently deprivation theories of collective action have staged a remarkable come-back in the study of ethnic conflict (Bates, 2015; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013), adding a new twist to an already volatile career (Buechler, 2004). The new reincarnation of this once dominant approach to the study collective action is characterized by important conceptual refinements that make the role of perception and cognition more explicit (Pfaff and Hechter, 2020; Hechter, Pfaff and Underwood, 2016; Simmons, 2014). Chief among these is the clearer distinction deprivation scholars make between *deprivations* that constitute objective disadvantageous situations of social groups and *grievances* as shared and subjective experiences of such conditions (Pinard, 2011).

Much like its theoretical forefathers this new body of work treats deprivation as a root cause of social mobilization (Gurr, 1970; Smelser, 1962). In this paper we draw on recent conceptual innovations in the deprivation literature but flip the causal arrow around by arguing that social movements anchored in subjective and incorrect definitions of deprivation can turn perceived but nonexistent deprivation into reality. We argue that this is particularly true for movements of subordinates (Hechter, Pfaff and Underwood, 2016) organized around ethnic boundaries (Olzak, 1992) which are active in small-scale hierarchical settings (Goldstone and Useem, 1999). Drawing on Merton's classic ideas about the social construction of reality, we label this process self-fulfilling grievances: grievances that result in the deprivation that was the object of the initial grievance (Merton, 1948; Biggs, 2009).

Drawing on ideas about the co-evolution of ethnic contention (Koopmans, 2004; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001), we identify three negative feedback loops (Biggs, 2003) that link mobilization based on false perceptions of grievances to objective deprivation. Each of these mechanisms is rooted in the notion that mobilization by minorities hardens fault lines between minority and majority groups (Wimmer, 2013; Blalock, 1982; Olzak, 1992; Kopstein and Wittenberg, 2018; Tolnay and Beck, 1995). This in turn ac-

tivates 1) negative responses by majority elites (Almeida, 2003; White, 1989; Loveman, 1998; Wood, 2003), 2) backlash by majority peers (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996; Andrews, 2002; Cunningham and Phillips, 2007), and 3) demoralization among minorities themselves (McAdam and Tarrow, 2010; Gecas, 2000; Duyvendak, 1995) which together transform originally false grievances into real objective deprivations. Taken together these three mechanisms draw attention to the perverse and unintended consequences of social mobilization (Giugni, 1998; Paul, Mahler and Schwartz, 1997; Tilly, 1999).

We develop this argument through a study of the Flemish Front Movement which emerged in the trenches of World War 1 (WW1) Belgium. Ever since its birth the Belgian state had been home to Flemish and Walloon communities which continuously renegotiated their relationship with the overarching Belgian nation (Wimmer, 2002). During WW1, tensions between the two language communities burst to the surface (Witte and Craeybeckx, 1987). Flemish soldiers were underrepresented among the higher ranks and orders were customarily delivered in French (Schepens, 1982). Cultural inequalities between the linguistic communities had been recognized, and a law intended to address this had been set to go into effect in 1917, but was delayed by the outbreak of war (Draper, 2018). Among Flemish foot soldiers this resulted in the belief that they were intentionally placed at higher risk during battle. From July 1917 onward the Flemish Front Movement began to formally articulate these grievances. For a period of 2 months from July-September 1917 they staged a wave of protests demanding equal protection (De Schaepdrijver, 2013).

Based on commemoration books, war graves, and military files we have created a unique database of approximately 60 percent of all soldiers that fought in the Belgian army at the start of WW1 (Draper, 2018). For each of these soldiers we retrieved their language community, unit, rank and date of death. We paired this individual level dataset with unit level information on Flemish Front Mobilization, Walloon countermobilization, repression, and Flemish demoralization as proxied by desertion rates. This dataset allows us to analyze the dynamic relationships between differential survival and Flemish mo-

bilization. Difference-in-difference analysis and Piecewise exponential models of Belgian soldiers reveals that Flemish soldiers were more likely to perish after (and not before) the Front movement started mobilizing and that this change was more pronounced in units that experienced Front movement mobilization. Additional tests suggest that these patterns emerged because of negative responses to protests by Walloon peers and superiors. Taken together our findings demonstrate the importance of self-fulfilling grievances, an understudied process through which movements socially construct reality.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we will give a brief overview of the Flemish Front Movement and its demands. Following that we further develop the idea of self-fulfilling grievances, highlighting 3 distinct feedback loops. We then specify our hypotheses and, in section 4, outline our data collection and analysis methods. The empirical analysis is presented in section 5 where we analyze the differential survival of Flemish and Walloon soldiers before and after mobilization in units with and without protests using piecewise exponential models and difference-in-difference analysis. The conclusion discusses the implications and scope conditions of our theory.

2 The Flemish Front Movement

In the late 1820s a coalition of liberal Catholics and secular free thinkers staged an insurgency against the Protestant King of the Netherlands. This national revolution, largely carried by an urban upper class, was rooted in a diffuse coalition of ethnically-diverse interest groups held together by an avid aversion for Dutch economic and religious policies. Its internal weaknesses notwithstanding, the movement succeeded in establishing an independent Belgian nation with support of the major European powers who had an interest in creating a neutral buffer zone between Germany and France. In exchange for land, Belgium obtained international recognition in 1839 (Stengers, 2000)

Over time, the newly-established kingdom, born of compromise and external influence rather than homogeneity, started experiencing frictions between its two largest and almost

completely segregated ethnic groups: The Francophone Walloons living in the south and the Flemish, speakers of a wide range of Dutch dialects, in the north. While the former lamented the economic backwardness of the north, the latter objected to French becoming the only official Belgian political language. Although the Flemish-Walloon cleavage remained remarkably peaceful through the better portion of the nation's first century, WWI transformed it into the central axis of political contention (Witte and Craeybeckx, 1987).

Initially, the invasion of the German military in 1914 forced Belgians to put their internal differences aside. The pending threat of war made conscription mandatory for all Belgian men, resulting in the mobilization of over 100,000 soldiers, and affecting around twenty percent of all Belgian households (De Vos, 1985). Historically, army conscription was seen by Belgian elites as an important tool for forging a strong Belgian nation that could mend ethnic cleavages (De Schaepdrijver, 2013). Draft lotteries, in combination with a family representation system in which each household had to deliver one conscript (from 1909 onwards), were used to mix soldiers from different ethnic backgrounds in interregional army units to produce a cohesive military melting pot (De Vos, 1985). King Albert I successfully appealed to both Walloon and Flemish identities to unite the entire country in a prolonged war effort against the German invaders (Schepens, 1982).

This early boost in Belgian nationalism did not last however. When early setbacks during WWI forced the Belgian military to retreat, they regrouped with the help of allied forces and established an entrenched front line running from the coastal city of Nieuwpoort to the village of Diksmuide. Achieved by opening the locks retaining the Yser River and allowing the plains to flood, much of this front line consisted of a long, shallow lagoon that demarcated the Allied and German positions nearly until the end of the war in 1918 (De Schaepdrijver, 2013; Draper, 2018). In the trenches, ethnic tensions between the two language communities reappeared among the lower ranks. Flemish foot soldiers were underrepresented in the officer corps and felt discriminated against. Many Flemish soldiers did not understand the instructions in French they received from their

predominantly Walloon superiors and complained that they were more likely to be court-martialed (Schepens, 1982). As a result, they felt they were at higher risk of perishing at the front than their Walloon, peers as their officers simply did not care about their lives: "Yet again one less Flemish soldier to worry about" Walloon officers were overheard saying as a Flemish foot soldier was transported to the field hospital (Vanacker, 2000, p. 97). Cyriel Verschaeve, an army chaplain and one of the most prominent leaders of the later Flemish movement wrote during these days at the front that "out of the systematic and stupid neglect of the Flemish language emerges the true state of the Belgian military: a corps of officers who are like an alien army lying within protected walls while their soldiers are kept outside unprotected" (Vanlandschoot, 1998, p. 169).

This sense of unequal risk was exacerbated by the belief that Walloon soldiers were more often given less dangerous supportive roles further away from the line of fire. Stretcher-bearer Ghysebrechts, for instance, claimed that Flemish soldiers were more likely to get hit by foreign fire as they constituted more than 80 percent of all those filling sand bags at the immediate front line, while 80 percent of all the easy jobs such as messenger, phone operator or bicycle courier went to Walloons (Vanacker, 2000, p. 190).[1]

From March 1917 onward, a fragmented clandestine network of pro-Flemish soldiers engaged in a few defiant acts, such as painting Flemish translations of French texts on the inside walls of the trenches.[2] In July 1917 a majority of these dispersed networks came together under the unified banner of the Flemish Front Movement. Their first act was the publication of an open letter to king Albert I who was deemed the last reliable elite ally of the Flemish cause. On its first page, Adiel DeBeuckelaere, one of the movement's initial leaders, clearly expressed the movements' grievances. "Only the officers who constantly bully the Flemings, to whom a Fleming is the lowest creature on earth [...] they alone are true patriots and competent to speak about soldiers' welfare [...] The Flemish meanwhile know they are doomed to fill the sandbags, to keep going to the trenches" (Hermans, 2015, p. 232). Following the publication of the letter a wave of large Flemish Front demonstrations and strikes spread across Belgian army units. Although some Flemish

politicians sympathized with the cause, the military leadership rejected the claims and demands of the Front Movement and accused them of being unpatriotic (Schepens, 1982). One captain commented: "If we start favoring the Flemish, we favor German spies. Without the Flemish there would be no traitors" (VanLandschoot, 2011, p. 112). In the aftermath of the demonstrations, relations between Flemish and Walloon soldiers further soured, mutual suspicion spread, and ethnic fault lines hardened. Increased antagonism revealed itself in at least three specific ways.

First, the military leadership established a special repressive unit to uproot the Front Movement, who they perceived as undermining cohesion among the troops. This agency initiated strip searches, arrested Flemish suspects without strong evidence, stole personal belongings of Flemish soldiers who perished, randomly transferred Flemish soldiers to different units, and even deployed undercover agents in the trenches (Monballyu, 2010). This resulted in further mutual distrust among both camps and forced several Flemish soldiers to transfer to different units, away from the teams with whom they become accustomed. In a period of less than 2 years, a total 63 Flemish soldiers were persecuted for involvement in the Flemish movement (Monballyu, 2010). In response to these repressive tactics, several prominent Flemish Front members expressed concern that their superiors would be delighted if they were to be killed in battle (Vanacker, 2000, p. 239).

Second, the Front Movement activated animosity among Walloon peers, who rejected the claims of their Flemish peers and accused them of disloyalty. Several Walloon soldiers declared that all Flemish soldiers were unreasonable separatists or went as far as to say that Front Movement "types deserved to be executed" (Vanacker, 2000, p. 207). Not surprisingly, throughout 1917 fights between Flemish and Walloon groups broke out (Monballyu, 2010). This Walloon resentment culminated in the organization of a series of Walloon counter-protests against the Flemish cause across different units (Vanacker, 2000).

Third, some Flemish soldiers became disillusioned with the fight for a unified Belgium. Numerous Flemish soldiers claimed that they would rather fight the Walloons than the

Germans (Vanacker, 2000, p. 207). Some Flemish nationalists did indeed take these sentiments one step further and decided to desert to the German side (Monballyu, 2013). After July 1917, 132 Flemish soldiers deserted, driven by pro-Flemish and hence anti-Belgian motivations (Monballyu, 2010). We will return to these three types of events in more detail in the next section when we outline the feedback loops that link imagined movement grievances to objective deprivation.

3 Mobilization and the Role of Grievances

Classical theories of "collective behavior", grounded in Durkheimian functionalism, understood social movement action through the prism of social integration and disintegration (Durkheim, 2014 [1893]; Rule, 1988). Collective action was thought to be a result of weakened social regulation and the emotional/psychological strain of marginalization or rapid social change (Lang and Lang, 1961; Park and Burgess, 1921; Park, 1927; Lang and Lang, 1961). Until the early 1970s and even as more sociological explanations of collective behavior emerged, the field of study shared a focus on grievances. Smelser (1962) constructed a six-part framework of determinants of collective behavior that situated structural strain and loosening social control alongside cultural and political factors like belief systems and the polity's "permissiveness" of collective behavior. Smelser's proposition that strain and the occurrence of collective behavior are linearly related exemplifies the collective behavior tradition's emphasis on dissatisfaction as a key explanatory variable. Analyses of relative deprivation reasoned similarly. In Ted Gurr's (1970, p. 13) formulation, relative deprivation "is a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities"; when social conditions change rapidly, such that people's expectations and their capability to realize those expectations fall out of sync, resistance is hypothesized to occur (see also Davies, 1969, 1962).

These "strain and breakdown" approaches would be rapidly supplanted by alternative theories emphasizing organizational resources (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Morris, 1984)

and political conditions and processes (McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1989) for two reasons. First, drawing from Olson's (1965) rationalist analysis of the collective action problem, the new theories rejected views of collective actors spurred by frustration or dissatisfaction and operating spontaneously or extra-institutionally; where were the meso-level political processes and patterns of group conflict (McAdam, 1982; Tilly, 1978)? Second, the emergent perspectives asserted the "constancy of discontent" (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1988, p. 697). Since grievances were ubiquitous, they could not differentiate between cases in which mobilization did and did not occur (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Jenkins, 1983; Tarrow, 2011; Tilly, Tilly and Tilly, 1975). However, by shifting emphasis to the organizational and political conditions of possibility for collective action and accompanying processes of meaning-making, these theories have equipped sociologists to retool their conceptualizations of grievances.

Building on the progress of social movement studies in recent decades, grievance-based theories of collective action have recently undergone a revitalization. An important advance related to the cultural turn in social movement studies and the cognitive turn (DiMaggio, 1997; Johnston and Klandermans, 1995) underscores the importance of how groups construe potentially threatening situations. Indeed, contained within the concept of grievance is the fact of perception of a set of conditions as unjust or harmful (Pinard, 2011). While earlier theories did recognize that conditions must come to be perceived as unjust for them to become motivating grievances (see Smelser, 1962, on generalized beliefs), recent studies of grievances have explored this much more thoroughly (Simmons, 2014; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013).

Reckoning further with the effect of grievances as motivational forces in collective action requires some definitional work. "Deprivations" constitute "disadvantageous conditions or morally objectionable situations", whereas "grievances" are "experienced sentiments of discontent about such actual or anticipated conditions or situations". Deprivations thus refer to objective conditions, while grievances refer to subjective understanding of these conditions. "Threats", meanwhile, designate deprivations or grievances that are

"only anticipated" (Pinard, 2011, p. 5). Disentangling these terms will sharpen our understanding of how these motivational dimensions function in collective action.

Threat or deprivation is not a sufficient condition to explain mobilization; these circumstances must come to be seen as unjust or dangerous. That is, they must become grievances. Several dimensions of how a given threat is perceived – such as its severity, its credibility, its applicability to local actors, and its responsiveness to collective efforts – pattern the emergence of mobilizing grievances (Einwohner and Maher, 2011; Maher, 2010). Such perceptions are further filtered through local experiential contexts. For example, studies of a set of "communities at risk", all of which were proposed sites for energy infrastructure projects but only some of which saw community mobilization opposing the project, found that factors including prior experience with the energy industry and existing economic links to the industry predicted whether the energy projects were seen as threatening and mobilization emerged (McAdam and Boudet, 2012; Wright and Boudet, 2012).

Grievances that mobilize are collective grievances, not private grievances constituted within individual minds. McVeigh's (2009) power devaluation model argues that diminished political, economic, or symbolic status does not directly trigger mobilization, but rather provides grist for the ideological machinery of activists and movement entrepreneurs. This formulation addresses the critique of the ubiquity of grievances; collective grievances are time-variant because the collective interpretation of deprivation is mutable. The effectiveness of these collective action frames, the extent to which they resonate (McDonnell, Bail and Tavory, 2017; Snow and Benford, 1988), depends in part on the audience's expectations in life. Accordingly, structural grievances, defined as time-constant deprivations associated with subordinate positions, differ from incidental grievances, which stem from unexpected circumstances and exceed routine dissatisfaction. When conditions worsen beyond the expected level of structural grievances or when incidental grievances co-occur with their structural counterparts, rebellion is more likely. Governing institutions establish expectations regarding the exercise of power and distri-

bution of collective goods (Pfaff and Hechter, 2020). When these institutions are seen to be underperforming, collective and mobilizing grievances are more likely to take hold. Thus, like studies of "moral economy" that suggest cultural constructions of (im)morality supersede objective deprivation (Scott, 1977; Thompson, 1971), this analysis shows that motivational force depends upon expectations and norms of propriety negotiated between rulers and ruled.

In summary, the mobilizational capacity of injurious or unjust conditions is not constant, but contingent on the context in which the risk exists and most importantly on how local actors make sense of the risk (Biggs, 2006; Simmons, 2014). In this paper, we build on this growing literature not by showing how grievances come to be meaningful or to motivate collective action, but by documenting a heretofore undescribed process by which grievances inspire action that then results in the deprivation that was the object of the initial grievance. In other words, we rearrange the standard causal flow from deprivation to grievance to mobilization, instead tracing the course of grievance to mobilization to deprivation. We call this phenomenon self-fulfilling grievances (SFG).

3.1 Theorizing Self-Fulfilling Grievances

The term self-fulfilling prophecy (SFP), now a vernacular expression, was originally an analytic category proposed by Robert Merton. Drawing inspiration from Thomas' (1928) constructivist dictum, Merton defined an SFP as "a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false conception come true" (Merton, 1948, p. 195). He gives the example of a bank run, in which depositors, believing the bank to be insolvent, withdraw their holdings until the bank truly becomes insolvent. Merton emphasizes the primacy of the meaning of situations, as against the situation's "objective features". SFPs thus represent a particular case in the movement from internalization to externalization to objectivation (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). A (false) belief was internalized and acted upon, thereby externalizing it and eventually leading to objectivation if and when sufficient people engage in the routine. In the case of SFGs, that objectivation

entails realizing the grievance that was internalized at the start. We thus define SFGs as grievances that result in the deprivation that was the object of the initial grievance. With this general definition in place, how can one empirically document SFGs?

In his reprise of SFPs, Michael Biggs (2009, p. 296, emphasis added) articulates a more rigorous definition of the concept, which we extend to SFGs. Writing that "SFP comprises a causal sequence whereby an *actor's belief motivates behavior that turns it into reality*, while at the same time the *actor(s) misapprehend the causal sequence* as one whereby belief simply reflects reality", Biggs identifies two defining characteristics. First is the causal sequence moving from belief to reality and second is the subjects' misapprehension of that causal sequence. This specification provides a framework to theorize SFGs as a class of sociological phenomena.

First, we must account for the emergence of false beliefs among potential collective actors. Understanding threats not as objectively threatening, but dependent on interpretation as such, we see how movement entrepreneurs can operate as these interpreters, constructing situations as social problems (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Spector and Kitsuse, 1977). Movement organizations or leaders undertake framing work that diagnoses, prognoses, and ultimately motivates others to join, support, or act alongside a cause (Snow and Benford, 1988). Collective action frames play on identity via boundary framing that identifies "us" and "them" and the construction of collective identities that motivate engagement (Hunt, Benford and Snow, 1994; Polletta and Jasper, 2001; Silver, 1997). These mobilizational processes, then, can disseminate unfounded or partially founded grievances, but one must note that SFGs are conceptually distinct from framing processes. Both concepts attend to the role of sentiments and interpretations of injustice in motivating collective action (Gamson, 1992; Benford and Snow, 2000), but while framing helps answer the "mobilization question" (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996), SFGs refer to how collective constructions of reality may, in the course of mobilization, bring about the realization of those constructions. With some familiarity about the possible origins of false beliefs, the next empirical step is to show how false beliefs can make

themselves true.

Second, we must describe how these false beliefs could effectuate their realization, while the causal sequence remains misapprehended as independent of the original false belief. SFGs can function via a theory effect (Bourdieu, 1991). Political and intellectual descriptions or typologies can provide the ideational spark for actors, taking this vision to be true, to behave in ways that fulfill the description[3]. In Bourdieu's theorization, the potential for ideas to exert a theory effect depends on the symbolic capital of the person voicing the idea, reinforcing the role of movement entrepreneurs in the life cycle of SFGs. Returning to Biggs' (2009) elaboration of SFPs, we find additional resources to understand how grievances may self-fulfill. Biggs differentiates various subtypes of SFP, one of which is a three-step process termed "reactive conflict". First, X believes that Y is aggressive. Second, X therefore attacks Y. Third, Y retaliates, making the initial belief appear true, even though Y's attack was precipitated by the initial, potentially false belief. We later adapt and specify this process to identify three potential mechanisms through which grievances may self-fulfill in our case, but first we elaborate our theorization of SFGs by tracing its links to theories explaining ethnoracial conflict and boundaries.

The power-threat thesis proposes that majority groups enact or reinforce oppressive or discriminatory behaviors when minority groups appear to represent an increasingly strong claimant on political, economic, or symbolic resources (Blalock, 1967, 1982). Echoing Du Bois' (Du Bois, 1998 [1935]) analysis of the "color line" as an instrument of political economic social control buttressed by a social psychological feeling of superiority, this line of inquiry documents how competition, niche overlap, and status preservation can lead to the use of various, sometimes violent, tools to preserve power hierarchies (Bergesen and Herman, 1998; Muller, 2018; Olzak, 1990, 1992; Soule and Van Dyke, 1999; Wilkes and Okamoto, 2002). In the context of reactive conflict, the power-threat thesis explains when and why the majority group reacts: when X appears to encroach on Y's niche, the power-threat perspective hypothesizes that Y will retaliate to rebuff this encroachment. This encroachment may, but need not, constitute sustained collective action or even exist

substantially, so long as Y perceives it as threatening. For example, following the abolition of slavery in the U.S. and the rise of tenant farming, lynchings of Black Americans were more common when cotton prices were low or when labor demand was high (Tolnay and Beck, 1995). Lynching was thus a social control mechanism to contain the threat Black free labor posed to the South's white supremacist political economy. Protest or other claims to ethnoracially unequal resources or rights, then, can certainly cause backlash. Political versions of this threat mechanism also occur. For example, localities with greater support for ethnically tolerant political parties or Jewish nationalism were more likely to suffer a pogrom (Kopstein and Wittenberg, 2018). Thus, the notion of power-threat connects claims to unequally distributed resources, from everyday necessities to political rights, and repression by incumbents, but what of the symbolic boundaries that undergird these social inequalities (Lamont and Molnár, 2002)?

In the boundary perspective, ethnicity is a relational structure undergoing perpetual maintenance and modification by the many actors living within that instantiation of the relational structure (Brubaker, 2004; Jenkins, 1983). Unilateral rearticulations of these boundaries, like those contained within grievances or protest, are prone to provoke reaction, like those that drive SFG, from other actors in the structure. Wimmer's (2013) typology of boundary struggles illustrates this. For example, "transvaluation" strategies challenge extant ethnic hierarchies by either asserting the equality of different ethnic groups or by inverting the hierarchy and placing the presently marginalized group atop the power structure. Such claims will, by definition, provoke reaction, as the constituents of the structure affirm, negate, amend, appropriate, etc., the proposed change in categorical ordering. These conflicts acquire additional meaning when overlayed with issues of nationalism, as the cultural compromise that aims toward political integration and national identification of a nation-state's multiethnic constituents is under threat when some of its members challenge the ethnic structure (Wimmer, 2002, 2018). Thus, like the power-threat thesis, the boundary perspective elaborates how SFGs may unfold through a reactive sequence of conflicts, but it does so by emphasizing the symbolic structure

of ethnicity. Given the predicted role of minority mobilization in triggering majority backlash, we specify two hypotheses to test the occurrence of SFGs in general.

Hypothesis 1 (H1): *Flemish soldiers were more likely to be killed in battle than their Walloon counterparts after but not before the rise of the Flemish Front Movement.*

Hypothesis 2 puts a finer point on the reaction to minority protest by attending to the social proximity of protest.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): *This over time change in Flemish differential mortality rates is more pronounced in units that experienced Flemish Front protests.*

In addition to testing the general reactive logic of SFGs, we more precisely theorize how SFGs may unfold by differentiating three mechanisms of such reactive conflict.

The first model is one of elite antagonism (Table 1a). Even under authoritarian or repressive conditions, comparable to the power military officers hold over their subordinates, collective action can emerge, but an adequate organizational and ideological infrastructure is necessary. Social movement organizations developed in less repressive eras, for example, may pivot during repressive moments to organize collective action with new tactics or objectives (Almeida, 2003). Indeed, repression in one sector can trigger protest elsewhere, but participation in this risky mobilization requires dense interpersonal networks integrated in institutions that can support local action (Loveman, 1998; White, 1989). In addition to these factors, emotions, moral understandings, and the "pleasure of agency" also foster mobilization in violent or repressive contexts (Wood, 2003). This literature identifies the preconditions for grievances developed in risky situations to translate into anti-elite mobilization, but reaction is not a foregone conclusion. Studies examining predictors of state or elite repression identify the degree of threat posed by dissidents as an important explanatory variable (Earl, 2011; Soule and Davenport, 2009), evoking the power-threat thesis. The identity of the challengers is also found to influence the likelihood of repression, as already marginalized groups suffer more severely or are more likely to be targeted (Davenport, 2005; White, 1989; Wood, 2007). Reminiscent of

the power-threat approach, this mechanism proposes that grievances regarding ethnoracial inequality may be articulated in repressive settings, given adequate organizational and interpersonal infrastructure, but that elites will attempt to suppress these challenges commensurately to the material and symbolic threat they pose.

Second, peer antagonism may explain the realization of grievances (Table 1b). Here we build on research on movement-countermovement dynamics. In ethnic movement-countermovement relations, we see the logic of competition theory, as well as a version of the multilateral boundary struggles discussed above. Indeed, the mere fact of mobilization creates triggers for opposition mobilization: "By advocating change, by attacking the established interests, by mobilizing symbols and raising costs to others, [movements] create grievances and political opportunities for organizational entrepreneurs to define countermovement goals and issues" (Zald and Useem, 1987, p. 247-48). But countermobilization is not omnipresent; the conditions under which countermovements do tend to arise suggest when peer antagonism will emerge most forcefully. Theorizing a curvilinear relationship between movement accomplishments and countermovement genesis, Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) enumerate several propositions predicting the emergence of oppositional movements. To name a few, they argue that movement-countermovement conflicts are more likely to occur under governments with divided authority or of debated legitimacy, following landmark events for one movement, and in cases in which the opposition can link the conflict to cultural or moral divides. Perceptions of threat are also associated with countermobilization, but these processes are mediated by local organizational, political, and spatial processes (Andrews, 2002; Bélanger and Pinard, 1991; Cunningham and Phillips, 2007). These findings, describing the conditions for organized reaction, represent the high bar for the peer antagonism mechanism, but such antagonism may occur may informally as well, resembling the foot-dragging of everyday resistance (Johansson and Vinthagen, 2016; Scott, 1985). There is, then, broad support for various manifestations of this mechanism.

The third possible mechanism is one of demoralization (Table 1c). Research on feed-

back and self-reinforcing effects of earlier conflicts underpins this mechanism (Duyvendak, 1995; Opp and Kittel, 2010). Here, though, rather than collective action spreading like a forest fire (Biggs, 2003, 2005), we consider the dampening effect of defeats or setbacks. Accumulated defeats can engender deep quiescence (Gaventa, 1980), but more episodic losses can also change the motivations of collective actors. For example, following Barack Obama's continuation of Bush-era military and immigration policies, antiwar activists grew disillusioned and distanced themselves from the Democratic Party, with which they had collaborated through the early 2000s (McAdam and Tarrow, 2010). Political cultures evolve in the course of conflict (Wood, 2003), so negative experiences can depress participants' expectations about future action. The emotions of demoralization and disappointment may lessen focus and weaken collective solidarities (Jasper, 2018). We may also understand demoralization through the social psychological lens of values and collective identity. Moral and ideological values are core to all movements, and movements' most engaged participants take on these values as part of their senses of self. Consequently, unsuccessful movement efforts to advance these values have individual social psychological effects such as disillusionment or demoralization (Gecas, 2000).

[Table 1 about here.]

Having generically conceptualized these mechanisms, we now apply them to our case of Frontist mobilization. In the case of elite antagonism (Table 2a), Frontist grievances self-fulfill as officers, resenting Flemish nationalism or feeling threatened by the Frontist movement's demands of equality at home and at the front, retaliate against their Flemish charges, assigning them to more perilous positions or missions. The elite antagonism mechanisms would be evidenced by top-down repression of Flemish mobilization by the military authority.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): *This over time change in Flemish differential mortality rates is more pronounced in units where the Flemish Front Movement was repressed.*

The peer antagonism mechanism (Table 2b) would proceed similarly, with the exception that it is fellow soldiers who react against their Flemish fellows. Walloon soldiers halt cooperation with the peers they believe or know to be aligned with the movement and/or overtly mobilize against the Front movement. To test the occurrence of the peer antagonism mechanism, the fourth hypothesis posits:

Hypothesis 4 (H4): *This over time change in Flemish differential mortality rates is more pronounced in units where Walloon countermobilization took place.*

Finally, the demoralization mechanism (Table 2c) does not center the retaliation of superiors or peers as such, but the emotional aftermath of the failure of the July 1917 letter to trigger meaningful change. Believing the Belgian Army to discriminate against Flemings, Flemish soldiers experience a decline in morale that fractures their collective solidarity or lessens their motivation to fight, increasing their chance of death. To test the occurrence of the demoralization mechanism, we take desertion as an indicator of demoralization:

Hypothesis 5 (H5): *This over time change in Flemish differential mortality rates is more pronounced in units where the Flemish Front Movement members deserted.*

Each of the three above mechanisms is a version of the security dilemma: "what one does to enhance one's own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure" (Posen, 1993, p. 28). Flemish protests, intended to combat the mortality disparity some Flemings believed existed, either provoked responses from officers, from other soldiers, or weakened internal resolve, ultimately further endangering the protesting soldiers.

[Table 2 about here.]

4 Data & Methods

Analysis of SFGs is challenging as it requires one to to show both the causal effect of a false belief and actors' misapprehension of the causal sequence as driven by a false belief. Generally, there are two methodologies suited to the task (Biggs, 2009). The first is experimental methods. Tests of placebo effects illustrate this approach. Artificial settings that deceive experimental subjects, like a music download site with fictive song popularity indicators, have also been used to document SFPs (Salganik and Watts, 2008). The second approach is longitudinal quantitative analysis. In this method, measures of the outcome of interest (e.g., mortality rates of soldiers) are collected before and after the emergence of a false belief. Studies modeling the effect of teachers' expectations of student performance on these pupils' future performance exemplifies this strategy (Biggs, 2009). We, too, take this approach here, using fine-grained overtime information on the differential mortality of Flemish and Walloon soldiers fighting during WW1.

4.1 Data

To test our hypothesis we compiled a database of individual soldiers who served in the Belgian army. We drew on two sources. First, we utilized the *Guldenboek Der Vuurkaart* which provides information on place of residence, military unit and rank of all weapon carrying veterans who survived WWI (Guldenboek der vuurkaart 1933). Second, we draw on the registry of WWI victims kept at the In Flanders Field Museum (IFFM) which contains the same data for Belgian soldiers who perished during WWI, as well as their date of death. By combining these two sources we were able to retrieve information on 120,000 of the 190,000 soldiers who served in the Belgian military at the start of the war. For each of these soldiers we were able to retrieve whether they were Flemish or Walloon[4], their rank, in which unit they served and their date of death. Although this dataset is not complete, it provides the most comprehensive and complete database of Belgian military men overtime to date. As we are interested in the fate of lower ranked

soldiers, we removed all officers from our dataset. Our database does include lower ranked soldiers that served in non-fighting roles, as this was considered one of the main drivers of inequality.[5] This selection resulted in a database of 75,159 soldiers. For each month that a soldier was active in the army we created a separate observation. Soldiers that were killed or deserted were marked as right censored. Soldiers entered the analysis the moment they joined the army. 15 percent of all soldiers in the sample perished during the war which is roughly in line with estimates that historians provide which vary between 12 and 16 percent (De Vos, 1985).

We paired this individual by month data set with unit-level information on Flemish movement protests, repression of the Flemish movement, Walloon countermobilization and desertion of Flemish nationalist soldiers. We created four dummy variables marking units in which these phenomena occurred or not. The first three measures are coded from Vanacker (2000), who provides an overview of the most important Front Movement events specified by unit. Data on repression is complemented with information from the individual persecution file compiled by Monballyu (2010). The latter measure is based on Monballyu (2013), who provides individual-level information on deserters, their unit, and their motivations based on post-war persecution records. Descriptives are presented in Table 3 below.

[Table 3 about here.]

4.2 Models

We seek to explain the differential survival of Flemish and Walloon soldiers in different units per month as a function of Flemish Front mobilization. This requires an event history analysis in which the unit of analysis is the spell or soldier-month. The dependent variable is Y_{iut}, a dichotomous variable coded 1 if a soldier i in unit u perishes in month t and 0 otherwise. The data starts in August of the year 1914 (the month in which fighting between the Belgian army and Wehrmacht started). Every soldier enters the analysis

once they are at risk of getting killed in combat. Once a soldiers dies he is removed from the data. We analyze 75,159 spells in total.

We are interested in estimating the hazard rate:

$$p_{iut} = prob(Y_{iut}) = 1 \Bigg| \sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} Y_{iu\tau} = 0 \tag{1}$$

This is the probability that a soldier i in unit u perishes in month t, conditional on the fact that a soldier did not die before t (Allison 2014). We want to test the main hypotheses that 1) Flemish soldiers had a higher probability to perish after but not before the Flemish Front movement started mobilizing and 2) that this pattern was more pronounced in military units in which Flemish Front protests took place. To test these hypotheses we combine a basic difference-in-difference setup (Angrist and Pischke, 2009) with piecewise exponential models (Olzak, 2021; Allison, 2014). Both techniques allow us to estimate the impact of the Front Movement on the relative killing rate of Flemish soldiers while keeping constant some time-invariant differences and modeling time trends. All models below cluster standard errors at the unit level to relax the assumption that soldiers in the same unit are independent of each other. To test the first hypothesis we deploy two models. The first model we deploy is a piecewise exponential model that models the effect of being Flemish before and after the rise of the Flemish Front Movement, while including military unit and time fixed effects:

$$p_{iut} = p_0(t)exp(\beta_1 Flemish_i + \beta_2 Flemish_i After_t + \gamma_t + \gamma_u + \epsilon_{iut}) \tag{2}$$

Here $p_0(t)$ is a baseline hazard rate for all soldiers that score zeros on all the covariates in the model, *Flemish* is a dummy variable that marks Flemish soldiers and *After* is a dummy that marks all the months after July 1917 (when the Front movement sent its letter to the King). If our first hypothesis is true, we would expect β_1 to be indistin-

guishable from zero (i.e. Flemish soldiers were not more likely to perish before the rise of the Flemish Front Movement) and β_2 to be higher than zero (i.e. Flemish soldiers were more likely to perish after the rise of the Flemish Front Movement). The time (γ_t) and unit (γ_u) fixed effects would remove all time-constant and unit-invariant omitted variable bias.

As piecewise exponential models do not allow for the inclusion of time and soldier fixed effects we also estimate a traditional difference-in-difference model:

$$p_{iut} = \beta_0 Cons_{iut} + \beta_1 Flemish_i After_t + \gamma_t + \gamma_i + \epsilon_{iut} \tag{3}$$

Here we expect the interaction between Flemish and After is positive and different from zero. The coefficient should be interpreted as the increase in relative Flemish mortality after the emergence of the Flemish Front Movement (compared to before its emergence). The time (γ_t) and soldier (γ_i) fixed effects remove all time-constant and soldier-invariant omitted variable bias.[6]

Similarly, we also deploy two models to test the second hypothesis. The first one is a piecewise exponential model with unit and time fixed effects that allows the changes in Flemish survival to vary for units with and without Front Movement protests.

$$\begin{aligned} p_{iut} = p_0(t) exp(&\beta_1 Flemish_i + \beta_2 Flemish_i After_t + \beta_3 Protest_u After_t \\ &+ \beta_4 Flemish_i Protest_u + \beta_5 Flemish_i Protest_u After_t + \gamma_t + \gamma_u + \epsilon_{iut}) \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

Here protest is a dummy variable that marks units that experienced Front Movement protests. If our second hypothesis is correct we would expect β_5 to be positive and significantly different from zero. Whereas β_3 and β_4 control for differences in the overtime evolution of differential survival between units with and without protests, γ_t and γ_u model

away unit and time omitted variable bias. The traditional difference-in-difference model with soldier fixed effects looks as follows:[7]

$$(5) \quad p_{iut} = \beta_0 Cons + \beta_1 Flemish_i After_t + \beta_2 Protest_u After_t + \beta_3 Flemish_i Protest_u After_t + \gamma_t + \gamma_u + \epsilon_{iut}$$

The interaction of Flemish and After captures the increase in relative Flemish mortality rate after the emergence of the Flemish Front Movement (compared to before its emergence). The triple interaction tests whether this increase is larger in units that experienced protests.

We deploy a similar strategy to investigate the plausibility of the three suggested feedback loops (H3-H5). In the models below *Feedback* takes the value of 1 for units in which repression, countermobilization or Flemish nationalist desertion occurred and 0 otherwise. We would find support for the suggested feedback loops if the interaction between *Flemish*, *After* and *Feedback* is positive and significantly different from 0.

$$(6) \quad p_{iut} = p_0(t) exp(\beta_1 Flemish_i + \beta_2 Flemish_i After_t + \beta_3 After_t Feedback_u + \beta_4 Flemish_i Feedback_u + \beta_5 Flemish_i After_t Feedback_u + \gamma_t + \gamma_u + \epsilon_{iut})$$

$$(7) \quad p_{iut} = \beta_0 Cons + \beta_1 Flemish_i After_t + \beta_2 Feedback_u After_t + \beta_3 Flemish_i After_t Feedback_u + \gamma_t + \gamma_u + \epsilon_{iut}$$

Specified this way, the piecewise exponential and difference-in-difference approaches have different strengths and weaknesses. The piecewise exponential models provide us

with explicit estimates of survival rates for Flemish soldiers compared to their Walloon peers before and after the Flemish Front Movement started mobilizing. However, these models do not allow for the inclusion of individual level fixed effects and therefore leave room for time-invariant omitted variable bias to enter the analysis (Allison, 2002). Difference-in-difference models do allow for the inclusion of individual level fixed effects, but only provide estimates of the change in survival of Flemish soldiers compared to Walloon peers in different units after mobilization relative to before mobilization. As such, they do not allow one to asses the impact of being Flemish on survival before mobilization directly. Hence, whereas the piecewise exponential models provide a more direct test of Hypothesis 1, the difference-and-difference models provide more precise tests of Hypotheses 2 to 5.

5 Results

Our discussion of the results proceeds in two steps. As a first step we explore the relationship between Front Movement mobilization and Flemish mortality rates by looking at the differential survival of Flemish soldiers before and after the rise of the Flemish Front Movement in units with and without protests (H1-H2). As a second step we look at the role that the different feedback loops might have played (H3-H5).

Before presenting regression results, Figure 1 displays the differential killings of Flemish soldiers over time in units with and without Flemish Front protests. Whereas values on the x-axis above zero indicate that Flemish soldiers were more likely to perish, values below zero denote that Walloon soldiers were more likely to be killed. The vertical bar in blue marks the 2 months in which the wave of Flemish Front protests took place. The vertical line in black denotes the start of the counteroffensive in which Belgian and Allied forces pushed back the German Wehrmacht. Let us first focus on the general trend in both types of units. During the first three months of the war Flemish soldiers were less likely to be be killed than their Walloon peers. Over time, however, the survival of both

groups converged up until the start of the Flemish Front Movement. Right after the wave of Flemish protests ended, the differential mortality of Flemish soldiers begins to rise. This increase accelerates when the counteroffensive commences. This pattern is roughly in line with our notion of self-fulfilling grievances. While the perceived grievances that sparked the Flemish Front Movement were not objectively true initially, they turned into objective deprivations after the first wave of protest kicked in.

Now let us compare units with and without protests. After the first six months of the war, the differential killing of Flemish soldiers looks roughly similar in both types of unit. This changes somewhat during the first months of 1916, when Flemish soldiers were slightly more likely to perish than their Walloon peers in units that would later experience protests. From May 1916 onward, this difference starts to disappear. This trend, however, is strongly reversed again in July 1916 when the Front Movement protests start. Suddenly, the gap between units with and without protests increases rapidly. Hence, the relative mortality rate of Flemish soldiers increased rapidly after the emergence of the Flemish Front Movement and this increase was stronger in units that actually experienced protests. This is in line with the notion that changes in Flemish mortality were more pronounced in units with protests. It is important to highlight that in the year before the first Flemish Front Movement starts, the differential mortality rate of Flemish soldiers declined considerably in units that would later on experience protests. This suggests that the more pronounced shift in these units cannot be accounted for by preexisting trends and that the parallel trends assumption is met (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).

[Figure 1 about here.]

After having a first glance at the raw data, we start our regression analysis with the piecewise exponential models presented in the first 3 columns in Table 4. The first model presents the main effect of being Flemish without including any interaction terms. As one can see, Flemish soldiers were more likely to be killed if one ignores over time

changes. The second model presents the results of regressions based on equation (2). The model shows that Flemish soldiers were not more likely to be killed before the rise of the Flemish Front Movement. The contrast with the post-mobilization period is stark. In line with hypothesis 1, Flemish soldiers had an almost 50 percent higher hazard of being killed compared to their Walloon peers after the Front movement started mobilizing. The third model presents the regression produced by equation (3). Here we see that the over time shift in relative Flemish mortality is larger in units that experienced Flemish Front protests, finding support for our second hypothesis. After the rise of the Flemish Front movement, the hazard ratio is .23 higher in units that experienced protests compared to units that did not experience protests.

[Table 4 about here.]

As it is somewhat counterintuitive to interpret triple interactions, we visualize the results of model 3 in Figure 2. Regardless of whether a unit ended up experiencing protest, being Flemish did not increase the risk of getting killed before July 1917. However, after the Front Movement protests had taken place, being Flemish increased the rate of death by 30 percent for soldiers in units that did not experience protests and 39 percent in units that did experience protests. This is in line with our notion of self-fulfilling grievances. While Flemish soldiers were as initially as likely to perish as non-Flemings, mobilization by a movement that believed there were mortality disparities made this false belief true, in particular in units that experienced protests.

[Figure 2 about here.]

Models 4 and 5 (equations 4 and 5) reveal that these results hold in a traditional difference-in-difference set up with individual soldier fixed effects, suggesting that time-invariant soldier differences cannot account for this pattern. Compared to their Walloon peers, Flemish soldiers are .04 percent more likely to be killed in a given month after the mobilization wave relative to before. This difference is substantial given that the average

mortality rate per soldier-month is .08 percent. The triple interaction effect presented in model 5 is significant and indicates that this shift is almost twice as strong in units that experienced protest.

[Figure 3 about here.]

Figure 3 visualizes model 5. After the wave of Front Movement protests, being Flemish increased the risk of getting killed by more than 40 percent in units that did not experience protests and 73 percent in units that did. Hence in line with the first two hypotheses, we again see that the effect of being Flemish on getting killed increased after mobilization and that this increase was more pronounced in units which experienced actual protests.

[Table 5 about here.]

Table 5 presents the results of equations (6) and (7), which investigate the role of our three feedback loops (H3-5). Models 6-8 display the results of the piecewise exponential models, while Model 9 and 11 show the results of the difference-in-difference set up. In line with our first two feedback hypothesis, the increase in relative mortality rates for Flemish soldiers was stronger in units where officers repressed the Flemish Front Movement and Walloon soldiers organized counterprotests. This suggests that negative backlash against protests plays in important part in explaining the self-fulfilling grievances of Flemish soldiers. The effect of being Flemish on the hazard of being killed after mobilization increased by 25.6 percent in units where officers repressed the movement and 18.9 percent in units that experienced countermobilization. The first three models are visualized in Figure 2b-2d. If we look at Figure 2b we see that Flemish soldiers, compared to their Walloon peers, had a 29 percent higher chance of dying after mobilization in units that did not experience protests and a 37 percent higher chance in units that did. The difference is equally stark if we look at countermobilization. Whereas Flemish soldiers were 33 percent more likely to die compared to Walloon soldiers in units that did not experience countermobilization, Flemish soldiers were 46 percent more likely to die than Walloon soldiers after mobilization in units that did experience countermobilization.

Results are confirmed by the difference-in-difference estimations presented in Models 9-11. The triple interaction between being Flemish, after mobilization and repression as well as the triple interaction between being Flemish, after mobilization and countermobilization are positive and significantly different from zero, implying that the relative increase in Flemish mortality rates after mobilization is stronger in units that experienced repression or countermobilization. Figure 3 visualizes these shifts. Compared to their Walloon peers, Flemish soldiers in units in which no repression took place were 41 percent more likely to be killed in combat after Flemish Front mobilization relative to before mobilization. This shift was almost 75 percent in units that did experience repression. Flemish soldiers in units that experienced countermobilization were, compared to Walloon peers, around 35 percent more likely to perish after mobilization relative to before, while this shift was 70 percent in units which did experience countermobilization.

Finally, we find no support for the demoralization thesis (H6). According to both estimation strategies increases in Flemish mortality rates were the same in units with and without Flemish nationalist desertion. Taken together, this strongly suggests that negative reaction by Walloon peers and elites played a prominent role in transforming perceived grievances about differential mortality rates of Flemish and Walloon soldiers into reality.

6 Conclusion

Using the case of ethno-linguistic mortality disparities and the Flemish Front Movement in the Belgian army during WW1, this paper builds on the ongoing revitalization of grievance-based explanations of collective action. However, unlike most of this literature, we do not explore how grievances acquire meaning or the conditions under which they motivate collective action, but rather document a novel process we call self-fulfilling grievances. Adapting Merton's (1948) classic theorization of SFPs, we show how subjective and incorrect definitions of deprivation can turn perceived but nonexistent de-

privation into reality. In short, we show how (empirically unfounded) grievances may realize the deprivation that was its original object. We theoretically develop this process by drawing on the literature on movement repression, countermobilization, and the emotional and moral dimensions of collective action.

Our analysis provides evidence for the occurrence of SFGs in general and for two specific mechanisms – elite antagonism and peer antagonism – through which they can occur. Flemish soldiers were more likely to perish after, and not before, the onset of overt Front Movement mobilization. This disparity was more pronounced in units that experienced Front protests, as well as in units where the movement was repressed, evidencing elite antagonism, and where Walloon countermobilization occurred, evidencing peer antagonism. Thus, this work adds to recent studies of the mobilizational force of grievances by documenting the potential unintended consequences of movement cultural formations.

References

Allison, Paul. 2002. "Bias in fixed-effects Cox regression with dummy variables." *Manuscript, Department of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania* 97.

Allison, Paul. 2014. *Event History and Survival Analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Almeida, Paul D. 2003. "Opportunity Organizations and Threat- Induced Contention: Protest Waves in Authoritarian Settings." *American Journal of Sociology* 109(2):345–400.

Andrews, Kenneth T. 2002. "Movement-Countermovement Dynamics and the Emergence of New Institutions: The Case of "White Flight" Schools in Mississippi." *Social Forces* 80(3):911–936.

Angrist, Joshua D and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2009. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bates, Robert H. 2015. *When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. 2000. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26(1):611–639.

Benvindo, Bruno. 2005. *Des Hommes en Guerre: Les soldats belges entre ténacité et désillusion, 1914-1918*. Brussels: Archives générales du Royaume.

Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

Bergesen, Albert and Max Herman. 1998. "Immigration, Race, and Riot: The 1992 Los Angeles Uprising." *American Sociological Review* 63(1):39–54. Publisher: [American Sociological Association, Sage Publications, Inc.].

Biggs, Michael. 2003. "Positive Feedback in Collective Mobilization: The American Strike Wave of 1886." *Theory and Society* 32(2):217–254.

Biggs, Michael. 2005. "Strikes as Forest Fires: Chicago and Paris in the Late Nineteenth Century." *American Journal of Sociology* 110(6):1684–1714.

Biggs, Michael. 2006. "Who Joined the Sit-Ins and Why: Southern Black Students in the Early 1960s." *Mobilization* 11(3):321–336.

Biggs, Michael. 2009. Self-Fulfilling Prophecies. In *The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology*, ed. Peter Hedström and Peter Bearman. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press pp. 294–314.

Blalock, Hubert M. 1967. *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Blalock, Hubert M. 1982. *Race and Ethnic Relations*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1989. "Social Space and Symbolic Power." *Sociological Theory* 7(1):14–25.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991. *Language and Symbolic Power*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2004. *Ethnicity without Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Buechler, Steven M. 2004. The Strange Career of Strain and Breakdown Theories of Collective Action. In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Bélanger, Sarah and Maurice Pinard. 1991. "Ethnic Movements and the Competition Model: Some Missing Links." *American Sociological Review* 56(4):446–457. Publisher: [American Sociological Association, Sage Publications, Inc.].
URL: *http://www.jstor.org/stable/2096267*

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Halvard Buhaug. 2013. *Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cunningham, David and Benjamin T. Phillips. 2007. "Contexts for Mobilization: Spatial Settings and Klan Presence in North Carolina, 1964–1966." *American Journal of Sociology* 113(3):781–814.

Davenport, Christian. 2005. "Understanding Covert Repressive Action: The Case of the U.S. Government against the Republic of New Africa." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(1):120–140.

Davies, James C. 1962. "Toward a Theory of Revolution." *American Sociological Review* 27(1):5–19. Publisher: [American Sociological Association, Sage Publications, Inc.].
URL: *http://www.jstor.org/stable/2089714*

Davies, James C. 1969. The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion. In *The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

De Schaepdrijver, Sophie. 2013. *De groote oorlog: het koninkrijk België tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog*. Amsterdam: Atlas Contact.

De Vos, Luc. 1985. *Het effectief van de Belgische krijgsmacht en de militiewetgeving 1830-1914*. Brussel: Koninklijk Legermuseum.

De Wever, Bruno. 1994. *Greep naar de macht. Vlaams-nationalisme en Nieuwe Orde: het VNV 1933-1945*. Tielt, Belgium: Lannoo.

DiMaggio, Paul. 1997. "Culture and Cognition." *Annual Review of Sociology* 23:263–287.

Draper, Mario. 2018. *The Belgian Army and Society from Independence to the Great War*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

Du Bois, William Edward Burghardt. 1998 [1935]. *Black Reconstruction: An Essay Toward A History Of The Part Which Black Folk Played In The Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy In America, 1860-1880*. New York: The Free Press.

Durkheim, Emile. 2014 [1893]. *The Division of Labor in Society*. New York: Free Press.

Duyvendak, Jan Willem. 1995. *The Power of Politics: New Social Movements in France*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Earl, Jennifer. 2011. "Political Repression: Iron Fists, Velvet Gloves, and Diffuse Control." *Annual Review of Sociology* 37:261–284.

Einwohner, Rachel L. and Thomas V. Maher. 2011. "Threat Assessment and Collective-Action Emergence: Death-Camp and Ghetto Resistance during the Holocaust." *Mobilization* 16(2):127–146.

Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97(1):75–90. Edition: 2003/03/12 Publisher: Cambridge University Press.
URL: *https://www.cambridge.org/core/article/ethnicity-insurgency-and-civil-war/B1D5D0E7C782483C5D7E102A61AD6605*

Gamson, William. 1992. *Talking Politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Gaventa, John. 1980. *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Gecas, Viktor. 2000. Value Identities, Self-Motives, and Social Movements. In *Self, Identity, and Social Movements*, ed. Sheldon Stryker, Timothy J. Owens and Robert W. White. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Giugni, Marco G. 1998. "Was It Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 24(1):371–393.

Goldstone, Jack A and Bert Useem. 1999. "Prison riots as microrevolutions: An extension of state-centered theories of revolution." *American Journal of Sociology* 104(4):985–1029.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hechter, Michael, Steven Pfaff and Patrick Underwood. 2016. "Grievances and the Genesis of Rebellion: Mutiny in the Royal Navy, 1740 to 1820." *American Sociological Review* 81(1):165–189.

Hermans, Theo. 2015. *The Flemish Movement: A Documentary History 1780-1990*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Hunt, Scott A., Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow. 1994. Identity Fields: Framing Processes and the Social Construction of Movement Identities. In *New Social Move-*

ments: From Ideology to Identity, ed. Enrique Larana, Hank Johnston and Joseph R. Gusfield. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Jasper, James M. 2018. *The Emotions of Protest*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jenkins, J. Craig. 1983. "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 9:527–553.

Johansson, Anna and Stellan Vinthagen. 2016. "Dimensions of Everyday Resistance: An Analytical Framework." *Critical Sociology* 42(3):417–435. Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd.
URL: *https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920514524604*

Johnston, Hank and Bert Klandermans, eds. 1995. *Social Movements and Culture*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Koopmans, Ruud. 2004. Protest in time and space: The evolution of waves of contention. In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing pp. 19–46.

Kopstein, Jeffrey S. and Jason Wittenberg. 2018. *Intimate Violence: Anti-Jewish Pogroms on the Eve of the Holocaust*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Lamont, Michèle and Virág Molnár. 2002. "The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences." *Annual Review of Sociology* 28:167–95.

Lang, Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang. 1961. *Collective Dynamics*. New York: Crowell.

Loveman, Mara. 1998. "High-Risk Collective Action: Defending Human Rights in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina." *American Journal of Sociology* 104(2):477–525.
URL: *https://doi.org/10.1086/210045*

Maher, Thomas V. 2010. "Threat, Resistance, and Collective Action: The Cases of Sobibór, Treblinka, and Auschwitz." *American Sociological Review* 75(2):252–272.

McAdam, Doug. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McAdam, Doug and Hilary Schaffer Boudet. 2012. *Putting Social Movements in Their Place: Explaining Opposition to Energy Projects in the United States, 2000-2005*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. 1988. Social Movements. In *Handbook of Sociology*, ed. Neil J. Smelser. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications pp. 695–737.

McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, eds. 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McAdam, Doug and Sidney Tarrow. 2010. "Ballots and Barricades: On the Reciprocal Relationship between Elections and Social Movements." *Perspectives on Politics* 8(2):529–542. Publisher: Cambridge University Press.

McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 82(6):1212–1241.
URL: *http://www.jstor.org/stable/2777934*

McDonnell, Terence E., Christopher A. Bail and Iddo Tavory. 2017. "A Theory of Resonance." *Sociological Theory* 35(1):1–14.
URL: *http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0735275117692837*

McVeigh, Rory. 2009. *The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan: Right-Wing Movements and National Politics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Merton, Robert K. 1948. "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy." *The Antioch Review* 8(2):193–210.

Meyer, David S. and Suzanne Staggenborg. 1996. "Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity." *American Journal of Sociology* 101(6):1628–1660.

Monballyu, Jos. 2010. *De jacht op de Flaminganten*. Kortrijk, Belgium: De Klaproos.

Monballyu, Jos. 2013. *Deserteurs voor de Vlaamse zaak. Vlaamsgezinde militairen lopen over naar de vijand*. Kortrijk, Belgium: De Klaproos.

Morris, Aldon D. 1984. *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change*. New York: Free Press.

Muller, Christopher. 2018. "Freedom and Convict Leasing in the Postbellum South." *American Journal of Sociology* 124(2):367–405. Publisher: The University of Chicago Press.

Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Olzak, Susan. 1990. "The Political Context of Competition: Lynching and Urban Racial Violence, 1882-1914." *Social Forces* 69(2):395–421.

Olzak, Susan. 1992. *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Olzak, Susan. 2021. "Does Protest Against Police Violence Matter? Evidence from US Cities, 1990 through 2019." *American Sociological Review* 86(6):1066–1099.

Opp, Karl-Dieter and Bernhard Kittel. 2010. "The Dynamics of Political Protest: Feedback Effects and Interdependence in the Explanation of Protest Participation." *European Sociological Review* 26(1):97–109.

Park, Robert E. 1927. "Human Nature and Collective Behavior." *American Journal of Sociology* 32(5):733–741. Publisher: The University of Chicago Press.
URL: *https://doi.org/10.1086/214235*

Park, Robert E. and Ernest W. Burgess. 1921. *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Paul, Shuva, Sarah Mahler and Michael Schwartz. 1997. "Mass Action and Social Structure." *Political Power and Social Theory* 11:45–99.

Pfaff, Steven and Michael Hechter. 2020. *The Genesis of Rebellion: Governance, Grievance and Mutiny in the Age of Sail*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pinard, Maurice. 2011. *Motivational Dimensions in Social Movements and Contentious Collective Action*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Polletta, Francesca and James M. Jasper. 2001. "Collective Identity and Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 27(1):283–305.
URL: *https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.283*

Posen, Barry. 1993. "The security dilemma and ethnic conflict." *Survival* 35(1):27–47.

Rule, James B. 1988. *Theories of Civil Violence*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Salganik, Matthew J. and Duncan J. Watts. 2008. "Leading the Herd Astray: An Experimental Study of Self-fulfilling Prophecies in an Artificial Cultural Market." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 71(4):338–355.

Schepens, Luc. 1982. *Koning Albert, Charles de Broqueville en de Vlaamse Beweging tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog*. Tielt, Belgium: Lannoo.

Scott, James C. 1977. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Scott, James C. 1985. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Silver, Ira. 1997. "Constructing Social Change through Philanthropy: Boundary Framing and the Articulation of Vocabularies of Motives for Social Movement Participation." *Sociological Inquiry* 67(4):488–503.

Simmons, Erica. 2014. "Grievances do matter in mobilization." *Theory and Society* 43(5):513–546.

Smelser, Neil J. 1962. *Theory of Collective Behavior.* New York: Free Press.

Snow, David A. and Robert D. Benford. 1988. "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization." *International Social Movement Research* 1:197–217.

Soule, Sarah A. and Nella Van Dyke. 1999. "Black church arson in the United States, 1989-1996." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22(4):724–742. Publisher: Routledge.

Soule, Sarah and Christian Davenport. 2009. "Velvet Glove, Iron Fist, or Even Hand? Protest Policing in the United States, 1960-1990." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 14(1):1–22.

Spector, Malcolm and John I. Kitsuse. 1977. *Constructing Social Problems.* Menlo Park, CA: Cummings Publishing.

Stengers, Jean. 2000. *Histoire du sentiment national en Belgique des origines à 1918.* Bruxelles: Racine.

Tarrow, Sidney. 1989. *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965-1975.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Tarrow, Sidney G. 2011. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics.* 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thomas, William Isaac and Dorothy Swaine Thomas. 1928. *The Child in America: Behavior Problems and Programs*. New York: A.A. Knopf.

Thompson, E.P. 1971. "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century." *Past & Present* 50(Feb.):76–136.

Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. New York: Random House.

Tilly, Charles. 1999. From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements. In *How Social Movements Matter*, ed. Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press pp. 253–270.

Tilly, Charles, Louise Tilly and Richard Tilly. 1975. *The Rebellious Century, 1830-1930*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Tolnay, Stewart E. and E.M. Beck. 1995. *A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882-1930*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

van Stekelenburg, Jacquelien and Bert Klandermans. 2013. "The social psychology of protest." *Current Sociology* 61(5-6):886–905. Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd. **URL:** *https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392113479314*

Vanacker, Daniel. 2000. *De frontbeweging: de Vlaamse strijd aan de IJzer*. Kokszijde, Belgium: Klaproos.

Vanlandschoot, Romain. 1998. *Kapelaan Verschaeve: Biografie*. Tielt, Belgium: Lannoo.

VanLandschoot, Romain. 2011. *Een Vlaamse viking aan het front*. Tielt, Belgium: Lannoo.

White, Robert W. 1989. "From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army." *American Journal of Sociology* 94(6):1277–1302.

Wilkes, Rima and Dina G. Okamoto. 2002. "Ethnic competition and mobilization by minorities at risk." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 8(3):1–23. Publisher: Routledge.

Wimmer, Andreas. 2002. *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Wimmer, Andreas. 2013. *Ethnic Boundary Making: Institutions, Power, Networks*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wimmer, Andreas. 2018. *Nation Building: Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall Apart*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Witte, Els and Jan Craeybeckx. 1987. *La Belgique politique de 1830 à nos jours: les tensions d'une démocratie bourgeoise*. Bruxelles: Editions Labor.

Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2003. *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Wood, Lesley J. 2007. "Breaking the Wave: Repression, Identity, and Seattle Tactics." *Mobilization* 12(4):377–388.

Wright, Rachel A. and Hilary Schaffer Boudet. 2012. "To Act or Not to Act: Context, Capability, and Community Response to Environmental Risk." *American Journal of Sociology* 118(3):728–777.
URL: *https://doi.org/10.1086/667719*

Zald, Mayer N. and Bert Useem. 1987. Movement and countermovement interaction, mobilization, tactics, and state involvement. In *Social Movements in an Organizational Society: Collected Essays*, ed. Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books pp. 247–271.

ENDNOTES

[1]This conflict was further reinforced by the fact that the German occupying force during WWI tried to co-opt the Flemish movement by developing a narrative of Germanic affinity and promising to provide the Flemish community with group rights, like a Dutch-speaking university in Ghent, denied them to that point. In effect, factions of the Flemish movement did collaborate with the Germans (De Wever, 1994; De Schaepdrijver, 2013).

[2]These small cells often tapped into Flemish cultural associations and Catholic networks that were active at the front (De Schaepdrijver, 2013).

[3]The likelihood of a vision of the world taking subjective hold is proportional to its concordance with objective conditions (Bourdieu, 1991, 1989). Marxism, Bourdieu's preferred example of theory effect, exerted such a strong theory effect because the relations of production were in fact defined by owners of capital, on one hand, and sellers of labor power, on the other. Meanwhile, even if a mortality disparity only emerged on the Yser front after Frontist mobilization, other linguistic and cultural inequalities already existed (Benvindo, 2005; Draper, 2018), making for a good fit between vision and conditions

[4]We removed German speaking soldiers from the analysis as they were outsiders to this conflict and, in any case, constituted a minuscule minority of soldiers.

[5]Results are significant but less strong if we include officers in our sample as well.

[6]Because of the inclusion of soldier fixed effects the main Flemish parameter which is constant for each soldier across time (i.e. soldiers did not change their ethnicity during the war) drops out of the analysis.

[7]Because of the inclusion of soldier fixed effects the main Flemish parameter and the interaction between Flemish and Protest which are both constant for each soldier across time (i.e. soldiers did not change their ethnicity and units did not change their status during the war) drop out of the analysis.

List of Figures



Figure 1: Mortality differences between Flemish and Walloon soldiers before and after Front mobilization. Protest period in blue. Start of siege marked in black.



(a) Units w/wo mobilization



(b) Units w/wo repression



(c) Units w/wo Walloon counterprotest



(d) Units w/wo Flemish defection

Figure 2: Effect of being Flemish on mortality rate in units with different characteristics before and after Front mobilization.



(a) Units w/wo mobilization



(b) Units w/wo repression



(c) Units w/wo Walloon counterprotests



(d) Units w/wo Flemish defection

Figure 3: Effect of being of Flemish on mortality rate in units with different characteristics after Front mobilization relative to before.

List of Tables

Table 1: Generically schematizing three mechanisms of self-fulfilling grievance

1. Subordinate group X believes institution or group Y exploits or discriminates against X
2. Due to (1), some/all members of X resist against Y
3. Leaders or elites in Y retaliate against X
4. The retaliation in (3) institutes exploitation or discrimination of X

(a) Elite antagonism mechanism

1. Subordinate group X believes institution or group Y exploits or discriminates against X
2. Due to (1), some/all members of X resist against Y
3. Other members of X resent the resistance, activating fault lines within X
4. Due to (3), cooperation within X breaks down and causes unequal outcomes attributed to exploitation or discrimination

(b) Peer antagonism mechanism

1. Subordinate group X believes institution or group Y exploits or discriminates against X
2. Due to (1), some/all members of X resist against Y
3. Resistance and accompanying conflict demoralize X
4. The demoralization lessens X's commitment to Y
5. Due to (4), outcomes for X worsen

(c) Demoralization mechanism

Table 2: Schematizing three mechanisms of self-fulfilling grievance in the WW1 Belgian military

1. Flemish soldiers believe they are more likely to die, due to anti-Flemish bias
2. Due to (1), Flemish soldiers protest against the military
3. Officers resent the protest and react by placing Flemish soldiers in more dangerous positions
4. Due to (3), more Flemish soldiers perish

(a) Elite antagonism mechanism

1. Flemish soldiers believe they are more likely to die, due to anti-Flemish bias
2. Due to (1), Flemish soldiers protest against the military
3. Other soldiers resent the protests and react by withholding support and cooperation from Flemish soldiers
4. Due to (3), more Flemish soldiers perish

(b) Peer antagonism mechanism

1. Flemish soldiers believe they are more likely to die, due to anti-Flemish bias
2. Due to (1), Flemish soldiers protest against the military
3. The unsuccessful protests and accompanying political conflict demoralize Flemish soldiers
4. The demoralization lessens Flemish soldiers' collective solidarity and otherwise weakens resolve
5. Due to (4), more Flemish soldiers perish

(c) Demoralization mechanism

Table 3: Summary statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Killed	3,181,640	.008	.088	0	1
Flemish	3,185,644	.535	.499	0	1
After	3,185,644	.249	.432	0	1
Protest	3,185,644	.613	.487	0	1
Repression	3,185,644	.601	.49	0	1
W. Counter mobilization	3,185,644	.031	.173	0	1
Desertion	3,185,644	.324	.468	0	1

Table 4: Differential Survival Flemish and Walloon Soldiers Before and After Front Movement in Units With and Without Mobilization.

	(1) PW EXP	(2) PW EXP	(3) PW EXP	(4) OLS	(5) OLS
Flemish	1.157***	1.015	1.096		
	(0.31)	(0.35)	(0.492)		
Flemish × After		1.484***	1.297***	.004***	.003***
		(0.83)	(0.90)	(.001)	.(001)
Protest × After			.544**		.002
			(.224)		(.001)
Flemish × Protest			.897		
			(.064)		
Flemish × After × Protest			1.239**		.003**
			(.116)		(.001)
Constant	.006***	.005***	.006***	.006***	.006***
	.(001)	.(001)	.(001)	.(001)	.(001)
Unit FE	Y	Y	Y	N	N
Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Soldiers FE	N	N	N	Y	Y
Observations (Tim at Risk)	3,181,640	3,181,640	3,181,640	3,1816,40	3,181,640
Soldiers (Spells)	75,159	75,159	75,159	75,159	75,159
Units	92	92	92	92	92
Log-Pseudolikelihood	-65786.992	-65683.553	-65544.182	3690331.388	3690411.038

Model 1-3: Entries are Hazard Ratios.
Model 4-5: Entries are Unstandardized Regression Coefficients.
Unit Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (Two-Tailed).

Table 5: Differential Survival Flemish and Walloon Soldiers Before and After Front Movement in Units With and Without Repression, Negative Responses from Walloon Peers and Flemish Nationalist Desertion.

	(6) PW EXP	(7) PW EXP	(8) PW EXP	(9) OLS	(10) OLS	(11) OLS
Flemish	1.097	1.015	.984			
	(.054)	(.035)	(.046)			
Flemish × After	1.285***	1.473***	1.538***	.004***	.003***	.004***
	(.089)	(.083)	(.119)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Repression × After	.518**			.001		
	(.111)			(.001)		
Flemish × Repression	.896					
	(.052)					
Flemish × After × Repression	1.256**			.002**		
	(.116)			(.001)		
Counter M. × After		1.502			−.001*	
		(.467)			(.001)	
Flemish × Counter M.		1.042				
		(.093)				
Flemish × Counter M. × After		1.189***			.004***	
		(.069)			(.001)	
Desertion × After			.686*			.001
			(.127)			(.001)
Flemish × Desertion			1.060			
			(.069)			
Flemish × After × Desertion			.961			.001
			(.095)			(.002)
Constant	.006***	.004***	.005***	.006***	.006***	.006***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Unit FE	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Soldiers FE	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Observations (Time at Risk)	3,181,640	3,181,640	3,181,640	3,1816,40	3,181,640	3,181,640
Soldiers (Spells)	75,159	75,159	75,159	75,159	75,159	75,159
Units	92	92	92	92	92	92
Log-Pseudolikelihood	- 65518.851	- 65662.755	- 65581.906	3690428.420	3690338.566	3690333.855

Model 1-3: Entries are Hazard Ratios.
Model 4-6: Entries are Unstandardized Regression Coeefficients.
Unit Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (Two-Tailed).